Federal Rule 26(a)(2) Expert Witness Disclosures: Strategies for Composing and Attacking Expert Disclosures by Bates, Douglas B. et al.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 83 | Issue 1 Article 4
2018
Federal Rule 26(a)(2) Expert Witness Disclosures:
Strategies for Composing and Attacking Expert
Disclosures
Douglas B. Bates
Stites & Harbison, PLLC, dbates@stites.com
Chelsea R. Stanley
Stites & Harbison, PLLC, cstanley@stites.com
James L. Burt III
Maloney, Bean, Horn & Hull, P.C., jim.burt@mbhhpc.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Evidence
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Douglas B. Bates et al., Federal Rule 26(a)(2) Expert Witness Disclosures: Strategies for Composing and Attacking Expert Disclosures, 83 J.
Air L. & Com. 67 (2018)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol83/iss1/4
FEDERAL RULE 26(A)(2) EXPERT WITNESS




JAMES L. BURT, III***
I. INTRODUCTION
GIVEN THE HIGHLY TECHNICAL ISSUES that typicallyarise in aviation-related litigation, experts often play a criti-
cal role. A plaintiff who fails to come forward with sound expert
testimony in support of her theory of liability risks summary dis-
missal. Conversely, any defendant who lacks expert testimony to
support his defenses realistically faces a poor outcome.
There are many steps that prudent aviation counsel should
take to ensure that she has expert testimony at her disposal.
Among these is compliance with the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). Even the most articulate ex-
pert armed with the most technically sound opinions will do a
party little good if the expert is excluded due to a failure to
properly disclose during discovery. Those on the receiving end
of flawed disclosures should be ready to: (a) limit the prejudice
caused by the defect; and (b) when possible, use the flawed dis-
closure to gain advantage, up to the exclusion of the expert’s
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Louisville, Kentucky offices of Stites & Harbison, PLLC. She is a member of the
firm’s Torts & Insurance Practice Service Group, and a significant portion of her
practice is dedicated to representing aviation clients.
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testimony. Whether a party is in the position of preparing the
disclosures or analyzing them for flaws, an understanding of the
Rule’s requirements is crucial.
II. THE RULE
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires a party to
disclose the identity of any witness who will provide expert testi-
mony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.1 Absent
a court order or stipulation, a party must make the required dis-
closure—either a full report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) or the
more limited disclosure under Rule 26(a)(2)(C)—at least
ninety days before trial.2 Expert opinions intended only as re-
buttal testimony must be exchanged within thirty days of the ini-
tial disclosure.3 A party also has a duty to supplement any
incorrect or incomplete information provided in her expert dis-
closures by the time the party’s pretrial disclosures are due.4
However, this rule does not provide an opportunity to disclose
new opinions after the original deadline for expert disclosures
has passed.5
A. RETAINED VS. NON-RETAINED EXPERTS
Prior to 2010, Rule 26(a) required a full written report from
an expert who was either retained to provide expert testimony
or was an employee that regularly gave expert testimony (re-
tained experts).6 The 2010 amendment to Rule 26(a) kept in
place the full written report requirement for retained experts
but added a less extensive disclosure requirement for all other
experts (non-retained, or percipient, experts).7 A party who in-
tends to elicit opinions from a non-retained expert must now
only disclose the subject matter of that expert’s testimony and a




5 Trinity Homes, LLC v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. Group, No. 1:04-cv-01920-SEB-
DML, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61701, at *9 (S.D. Ind. June 8, 2011) (“Although
Rule 26(e) does not itself define the word ‘supplement’ except in terms of re-
quiring a timely supplement to fix a discovery response that is incorrect or in-
complete in a material respect, common sense suggests (and numerous decisions
confirm) that an expert report that discloses new opinions is in no way a mere
supplement to a prior report.”).
6 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B) (2009).
7 Id. 26(a)(2)(B), (C) (2010).
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summary of the facts and opinions to which that expert is ex-
pected to testify.8
A non-retained expert witness is one whose “opinion arises
not from her ‘enlistment as an expert,’ but rather from her
‘ground-level involvement in the events giving rise to the litiga-
tion.’”9 It is possible for a witness to be a non-retained expert
with regard to certain portions of her testimony and a retained
expert as to other portions.10 If a party seeks to elicit testimony
from a non-retained expert witness “based upon facts, evidence,
or expertise outside the scope” of the expert’s individual obser-
vations, the expert must comply with the report requirements of
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) imposed on retained experts.11
The party seeking to avoid submitting a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) ex-
pert report bears the burden of proving that the report is not
required because the witness is a non-retained witness.12 A party
does not get to pick and choose between the requirements of
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and Rule 26(a)(2)(C) based on what is conve-
nient for her; “[i]t is the nature of the testimony . . . that deter-
mines whether a witness is exempt from the disclosure and
report requirements.”13
B. REPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR RETAINED EXPERTS
Under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), a party that intends to rely upon the
testimony of a retained expert witness “is required to furnish . . .
a report containing, among other information, ‘a complete
statement of all opinions’ the retained expert will provide, ‘and
the basis and reasons for them.’”14 So, “[s]imply disclosing the
8 Id. 26(a)(2)(C) (2017).
9 Speare Tools, Inc. v. Klein Tools, Inc., No. 13-C-324, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96541, at *4 (E.D. Wis. July 15, 2014) (quoting Downey v. Bob’s Discount PT
Furniture Holdings, Inc., 633 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2011)).
10 See, e.g., Meredith v. Int’l Marine Underwriters, No. JKB-10-837, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 41619, at *11 (D. Md. Apr. 18, 2011); Sullivan v. Glock, 175 F.R.D.
497, 500 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that the distinction lies in the “source of the facts
on which the witness’ expert opinion is based. . . . To the extent that a witness’
opinion is based on facts learned or observations made ‘in the normal course of
duty,’ the witness is a [percipient witness] and need not submit a [full] report.”).
11 See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., No. 09-
cv-00680, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156976, at *52 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2014).
12 Cinergy Communs. Co. v. SBC Communs., No. 05-2401-KHV-DJW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80397, at *10 (D. Kan. Nov. 2, 2006).
13 Brainstorm Interactive, Inc. v. Sch. Specialty, Inc., No. 14-cv-50-wmc, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158891, at *5-6 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 10, 2014) (quoting 6 JAMES WM.
MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.23[2][a][i]).
14 Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2008).
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expert’s name and contact information is not enough: A litigant
has not complied with the disclosure requirement until she has
disclosed the expert’s written report.”15
The report must comply with the precise standard set forth in
Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The report must contain: (1) a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and rea-
sons therefore; (2) the facts or data considered by the witness in
forming her opinion; (3) any exhibits that will be used to sum-
marize or support her opinion; (4) the witness’s qualifications,
including a list of her publications for the previous ten years; (5)
a list of all other cases in which she has testified in the previous
four years; and (6) a statement of the compensation to be paid
for her testimony.16
The report may not merely set forth an ultimate opinion with-
out providing “a line of reasoning arising from a logical founda-
tion.”17 The report “ ‘must not be sketchy, vague, or preliminary
in nature,’ and it must include ‘how’ and ‘why’ the expert
reached a particular result, not merely the expert’s conclusory
opinions.”18 Thus, “Rule 26(a) requires that the expert report
contain the basis and reasons for each opinion.”19
There is “a well-accepted notion that expert witnesses cannot
testify about facts or data, but fail to disclose the same.”20 Where
an expert “has not identified specific facts or data considered
. . . [her] report is useless in preparing for cross-examination.”21
Nor does Rule 26(a)(2) allow parties “to cure deficient expert
reports by supplementing them with later deposition testi-
15 Bell v. Ward, No. 3:12-CV-72-WGH-RLY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174573, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 2013) (“Rule 26 requires disclosure of experts’ reports—not
just their identities—because information about their opinions and methods are
essential to trial preparation.”) (citing Ciomber, 527 F.3d at 642–43)).
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vi).
17 Brainard v. Am. Skandia Life Assur. Corp., 432 F.3d 655, 664 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“[A]n expert who supplies nothing but a bottom line supplies nothing of value
to the judicial process.”).
18 Siburt v. U.S. Bank, No. 10-C-135, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94531, at *8 (E.D.
Wis. Aug. 23, 2011) (quoting Salgado by Salgado v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d
735, 742 n.6 (7th Cir. 1998)).
19 Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co. of New York v. Intercounty Nat. Title Ins. Co., No. 00-
C-5658, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9626, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2001) (emphasis in
original).
20 Ravo v. Covidien LP, 55 F. Supp. 3d 766, 776 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2014) (cit-
ing Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc.,
637 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
21 Siburt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94531, at *8 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
2018] FEDERAL RULE 26(A)(2) 71
mony.”22 In Ciomber, the Seventh Circuit explained that deposi-
tion testimony cannot cure a deficient report:
The purpose of Rule 26(a)(2) is to provide notice to opposing
counsel—before the deposition—as to what the expert witness
will testify and this purpose would be completely undermined if
parties were allowed to cure deficient reports with later deposi-
tion testimony. Allowing parties to cure a deficient report with
later depositions would further undermine a primary goal of
Rule 26(a)(2): to shorten or decrease the need for expert deposi-
tions. After all, the parties’ need for expert depositions would
increase if they could use deposition testimony to provide infor-
mation they should have initially included in their Rule 26(a)(2)
report.23
C. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR NON-RETAINED EXPERTS
All other expert witnesses are subject to the less extensive dis-
closure requirement.24 Under Rule 26(a)(2)(C), a party in-
tending to rely on the testimony of a non-retained, percipient
expert must only disclose “the subject matter on which the wit-
ness is expected to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702, 703, or 705 . . . and a summary of the facts and
opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.”25
The quintessential example of a non-retained witness is the
treating physician; however, other examples abound, including
the employee-engineer or accountant.26 As with Rule
26(a)(2)(B), a party may not satisfy Rule 26(a)(2)(C) by merely
citing to a “litany of . . . records.”27 Once again, a party may not
simply refer to an expert’s deposition testimony to meet the re-
22 Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 642 (7th Cir. 2008).
23 Id. (citations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) advisory committee
notes (1993) (noting that disclosures may reduce or eliminate the need for a
deposition).
24 Id. 26(a)(2)(C).
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(i)–(ii).
26 See In re Prograf Antitrust Litig, No. 1:11-md-02242-RWZ, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 138429, at *18 (D. Mass. June 10, 2014) (discussing treating physicians);
Tajornera v. Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, L.L.C., No. 13-0366, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73985, at *45–49 (E.D. La. June 7, 2016) (discussing engineers);
Mont. Connection, Inc. v. Moore, No. 3:12-cv-0824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
170867, at *12–14 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 21, 2015) (discussing accountants).
27 Ballinger v. Casey’s Gen. Store, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1439-JMS-TAB, 2012 U.S.
Dist LEXIS 45024, at *12 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2012) (holding that medical records
alone do not comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(C)).
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quirements of Rule 26.28 When a party fails to make a proper
disclosure, “there is no way to determine what the opinions are
that the [percipient witnesses] will express or the facts upon
which they rely to form these opinions,” and the testimony must
be stricken.29
D. CONSEQUENCES FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY
AND ADEQUATELY DISCLOSE
Failure to timely disclose the above-described information as
required by Rule 26(a) means that the party has “yet to properly
disclose these witnesses as experts.”30 “Under Rule 37(c)(1), ‘ex-
clusion of non-disclosed evidence is automatic and mandatory
. . . unless non-disclosure was justified or harmless.’”31 Thus, the
sanction for failure to disclose includes a shifting of the burden
to prove that the violation was “justified or harmless” to the non-
producing party. “In addition to or instead of this sanction, the
court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard
. . . may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.”32
Courts consider the following four factors when determining
whether an inadequate disclosure is harmless: “(1) the prejudice
or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered;
(2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likeli-
hood of disruption to the trial; and (4) the bad faith or willful-
ness involved in not disclosing the evidence at an earlier date.”33
Meeting the “substantially justified” or “harmless” exception can
28 Lane v. Walgreen Co., No. 1:12-CV-01180-SEB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86259,
at *14 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2014) (stating that Rule 26 is violated where a party
“simply refers to their depositions without setting forth a summary of . . . opin-
ions or giving an indication of the purpose for which she intends to use their
testimony”); see also Retractable Technologies, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127732, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2013) (“This is simply not
a fair substitute for the summary required by Rule 26.”).
29 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of McFarland, 2014 U.S Dist. LEXIS 156596, at *23
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014) (“Though extensive detail was not required, some detail
was.”) (emphasis in original).
30 Townsend v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:12-CV-371-JD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
136764, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
26(a)(2)(C)(ii)).
31 Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Musser v.
Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004)).
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(A).
33 E.g., David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 2003).
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be difficult, especially considering that the burden of proving
the exception is on the party facing the sanctions.34
“Without proper disclosures, a party may miss its opportunity
to disqualify the expert, retain rebuttal experts, or hold deposi-
tions for an expert not required to provide a report.”35 As a re-
sult of these and other ways a party may be prejudiced by an
improper disclosure, the sanction is severe, and there is no ex-
ception for substantial compliance.36 Accordingly, a failure to
comply with Rule 26(a)(2)’s disclosure requirements results in
the offending party not being permitted “to introduce the ex-
pert witness’s testimony as ‘evidence on a motion, at a hearing,
or at a trial.’”37
III. PRACTICE POINTERS
The following practice pointers are intended to serve both as
strategies for appropriately composing expert disclosures as well
as strategies to attack an opponent’s expert disclosures, if
inadequate.
A. STRATEGIES FOR PREPARING EXPERT REPORTS
As evidenced above, failure to timely comply with the dictates
of Rule 26 could result in your expert witness being stricken en-
tirely or being barred from providing certain opinion testimony.
Given the dire consequences that may result from a failure to
adhere to the rule, careful attention should be paid to proper
compliance.
1. Determine the Status of the Witness
In order to ensure that the expert disclosure is compliant, the
first step is to determine if the witness is a retained expert or a
non-retained expert. As mentioned above, if the witness was re-
tained to provide expert testimony or was employed by the party
and her duties regularly include giving expert testimony, then a
full expert report must be prepared. If not, and the witness is
merely a non-retained expert witness, it is sufficient to disclose
34 See JTS, LLC v. Nokian Tyres PLC, No. 3:14-cv-00254-JWS, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3252, at *4–5 (D. Alaska Jan. 6, 2017) (“Implicit in Rule 37(c)(1) is that
the burden is on the party facing sanctions to prove harmlessness.”).
35 Tribble, 670 F.3d at 759–60.
36 Id.; Bell v. Ward, No. 3:12-CV-72-WGH-RLY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174573,
at *4 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 9, 2013).
37 Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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only the subject matter of the testimony and a summary of the
facts and opinions to which the witness is expected to testify.38
In instances where the witness’s status is not readily obvious, re-
member that the burden of proof is on the party seeking to pro-
vide a summary report rather than a complete expert report.39
Thus, voluntarily adhering to the full reporting requirement
may be advisable to prevent a discovery dispute surrounding the
classification of the witness.
Appropriately classifying an expert witness creates a potential
trap for litigants that must be avoided in order to successfully
admit expert testimony. For example, consider Tokai Corp. v.
Easton Enterprises, Inc., in which Tokai submitted expert declara-
tions in opposition to Easton Enterprise’s motion for summary
judgment.40 The district court sustained Easton Enterprise’s ob-
jections to the declarations because Tokai failed to submit the
necessary written expert reports.41 On appeal, Tokai asserted
that the witness, as its employee, was entitled to offer an expert
declaration without an accompanying written report under Rule
26(a)(2)(B).42 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and
instead concluded, in relevant part, that Tokai had “failed to
introduce evidence indicating that [the employee’s] duties did
not ‘regularly involve giving expert testimony.’”43 In other
words, the court would not apply the employee exception associ-
ated with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) absent sufficient evidence demon-
strating that the exception truly applied.44
Tokai demonstrates the care that must be taken when classify-
ing experts. Where there is a lack of clarity as to the status of a
given expert and thus a lack of clarity as to the reporting re-
quirement, counsel may consider voluntarily adhering to the
full reporting requirement. Disclosing the report will not only
provide assurance that the witness or testimony will not be ex-
cluded, but also may prevent a costly discovery dispute.
38 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
39 E.g., Cinergy Communs. Co. v. SBC Communs., No. 05-2401-KHV-DJW, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80397, at *10 (D. Kan. Nov. 2, 2006).
40 Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
41 Id. at 1364.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1365.
44 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
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2. Prepare Early
As with many errors that occur in the practice of law, waiting
until the last minute to focus on an expert’s report substantially
increases the likelihood that the report will be flawed. Prepara-
tion for timely and compliant disclosures necessarily begins with
an early determination of what experts are necessary for your
particular case. Engaging the right expert at the early stages of a
case is critical in determining whether the technical theories
you wish to advance are supportable. A good expert is indispen-
sable in fleshing out the challenges that may exist in proving
your theories and identifying the flaws in your opponent’s theo-
ries. The earlier a party can bring the right experts on board the
better.
Retaining the expert is certainly just one step in avoiding last-
minute disclosures. Keeping the expert updated and aware of
deadlines is also critical. A surefire way to ruin an expert’s day is
to call or email her with an announcement that you need her
report by the end of the week. Another way to cause panic is to
inform the expert only days before the report is due that some
vital piece of information was forgotten. Such tactics will not
only make your expert look ten years older the next time you
see her, they will also likely result in a poor disclosure.
One way to avoid last minute issues is to set a deadline for the
expert to share a draft report well in advance of the disclosure
deadline. Rule 26(b)(4) protects such “drafts.”45 Rule 26(b) also
states that the work-product privilege of Rule 26(b)(3)(A) pro-
tects communications between the party’s attorney and a testify-
ing expert unless the communications
(i) relate to compensation for the expert’s study or testimony,
(ii) identify facts or data that the party’s attorney provided and
that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be ex-
pressed; or (iii) identify assumptions that the party’s attorney
provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions
to be expressed.”46
However, note that the exact contours of confidentiality in
this area are not clearly defined. For example, different courts
have interpreted the meaning of a privileged “draft” report dif-
ferently. In Dongguk University v. Yale University, the district court
granted a motion to compel the production of a testifying ex-
45 Id. 26(b)(4)(B).
46 Id. 26(b)(4)(c)(i)–(iii).
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pert’s notes.47 The court concluded that “as a general matter, an
expert’s notes are not protected by 26(b)(4)(B) or (C), as they
are neither drafts of an expert report nor communications be-
tween the party’s attorney and expert witness.”48 In contrast, the
court in Etherton v. Owners Ins. Co. held that a testifying expert
was not required to disclose “working notes” (five pages of calcu-
lations) because the notes were protected from disclosure as a
“draft” report.49
Accordingly, when counsel receives a draft report early, it is
critical to diligently consider which documents or other materi-
als may not be privileged. As a result of the lack of clarity in this
area of the law, counsel should attempt to adhere to the formali-
ties of the rules. For instance, be sure to ask the expert witness
to memorialize her opinions in actual draft reports rather than
independent notes or other documents that do not necessarily
resemble draft reports. This will lessen the likelihood that a
court will unexpectedly order the production of draft docu-
ments and potentially prevent a costly discovery dispute.
3. Review the Report Through an Adversary’s Eyes
In order to lessen the chances of the report being excluded, it
is important to review the report thoroughly for compliance.
When conducting such a review, consider the level of attention
that your opponent will devote to finding flaws. At a minimum,
counsel should subject the report to the same level of scrutiny.
Conducting the review as the opponent would necessarily
mean that you do not just take the expert’s word that she has
made a proper disclosure of the required information. Perhaps
the most obvious place to begin when conducting the review is
with a determination of whether the expert has included all of
the opinions and supporting facts that are necessary to support
the theory for which the party is using her. A good method to
do so is to go through a mock direct and cross examination of
the expert’s expected trial testimony. If the expert needs to
draw upon opinions and facts that are not in the report in order
to testify adequately, the report is undoubtedly flawed.
47 Dongguk University v. Yale Univ., No. 3:08-CV-00441-TLM, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 157690 (D. Conn. May 19, 2011).
48 Id. at *3.
49 Etherton v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 10-cv-00892-MSK-KLM, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21992, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2011).
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The expert must also disclose all facts or data “considered by”
the witness in forming her opinion. As part of this requirement,
most experts will list the materials they have reviewed. It is good
practice to check that list to determine whether the expert has
omitted any vital information. It may be that the expert has de-
liberately chosen not to utilize a particular source. However,
even if that is correct, it is worthwhile to at least understand why
the expert chose not to consider the source.
In addition to disclosing all facts or data “considered by” the
witness in forming her opinion, Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) requires
disclosure of the “basis and reasons” for the expert’s opinions.50
All too often, experts skip directly from observations to conclu-
sions without describing or, indeed, performing a process by
which the observations have been evaluated, analyzed, or calcu-
lated to produce their conclusions. This is particularly problem-
atic where quantitative conclusions are stated based on
qualitative observations without intervening quantitative analy-
sis. Some courts are less strict in enforcing this aspect of the rule
than others, but the careful practitioner will want to both see
and disclose the analytical process employed by her expert.
Mathematics has been said to be the language of science, and
advocates purporting to advance scientific theories should em-
ploy that language.
Moreover, although the expert may believe that she has listed
her publications and cases for the relevant time periods, doing
separate research into these topics prior to the report’s due date
can reveal new cases or publications that may not only be absent
from the list, but also may not have been available when counsel
first vetted the expert. Performing a LexisNexis search for cases
and publications will help ensure that the expert has not omit-
ted required information.
4. No Ghostwriting
On occasion, it may be tempting to write the expert’s report
and merely have the expert summarily bless and sign it. Resist
this temptation. Where an expert report is required, the report
must be “prepared and signed by the witness.”51 Courts interpret
the requirement that the report be “prepared” by the expert as
requiring the expert, not the attorney who retained the expert,
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i).
51 Id. 26(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
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to draft the report.52 In fact, “numerous courts have admon-
ished attorneys for ghost-writing their experts’ reports, going as
far as to preclude experts from testifying.”53
This does not mean that a lawyer is precluded “from provid-
ing assistance to experts in preparing the reports.”54 The advi-
sory committee notes to Rule 26 expressly contemplate attorney
involvement in drafting the expert’s report.55 Thus, an attor-
ney’s involvement in drafting the expert report does not some-
how make the report inadmissible. However, the report must be
“written in a manner that reflects the testimony to be given by
the witness.”56
B. STRATEGIES FOR OPPOSING EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES
An opponent’s failure to comply with the dictates of Rule 26
can prejudice your ability to “retain rebuttal experts, or hold
depositions for an expert not required to provide a report.”57
Accordingly, proper steps should be taken to limit the
prejudice, including moving to strike the opponent’s expert
testimony.
1. Determine Whether the Report is Technically Compliant
As previously stated, the required contents of the report are
extensive, and the report provided by the expert must be “de-
tailed and complete.”58 These requirements are not mere for-
malities. Expert reports have been excluded for a variety of
reasons including occasions where (1) the expert’s opinions
were largely unsupported; (2) the expert’s qualifications were
omitted; (3) there was no statement of the compensation re-
ceived; and (4) the expert’s previous testimony was not in-
52 United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, No. 3:07-cv-604-M, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99480, at *34 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2016) (discussing holdings from
other courts).
53 Id.
54 FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
55 Id. (“[I]ndeed, with experts such as automobile mechanics, this assistance
may be needed.”).
56 Id.
57 Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Town-
send v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:12-CV-371-JD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136764, at
*9 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii)).
58 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(vi); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 Advisory Commit-
tee Notes.
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cluded.59 As a result, carefully determine whether the
opponent’s expert report satisfies each of these conditions.
To do this, make a checklist of each of the items that must be
included in the report and carefully comb through the expert
report to make sure each of the items is present. This will re-
quire independent research. For instance, LexisNexis searches
can be performed that list the cases in which the expert has pro-
vided testimony, and searches may be performed on other plat-
forms, such as JSTOR, to find publications authored by the
expert. Some of this analysis may even necessitate the use of the
party’s own expert, who will be able to point out instances in
which the opponent’s expert failed to provide support for an
opinion. As counsel performs this analysis, she should note any
discrepancies between the actual disclosure and what should
have been disclosed.
This method was used to exclude an expert in a recent avia-
tion case.60 In granting the motion, the court held that it was
“particularly disturbing” that the expert did not include a “com-
plete and useful list of trial or deposition testimony for the last
four years.”61 The court stated that “Rule 26 requires more than
attempted compliance; it requires mandatory disclosure of all
deposition and trial testimony within the past four years, to-
gether with sufficient information about where that testimony
was given to enable the opposing party to gain access to it.”62
This basis alone was sufficient to exclude the witness, thereby
demonstrating the importance of notating when an expert dis-
closure is not complete.
2. Exposing Weaknesses in the Expert’s Report
Problems with an expert’s report are not always readily appar-
ent from the face of the report and sometimes can only be de-
termined by deposing the expert.63 When addressing the report
59 See, e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts Inc. v. Patel, 174 F. Supp. 2d 202, 213 (D.N.J.
2001); Santiago-Diaz v. Laboratorio Clinico y de Referencia del Este, 456 F.3d
272, 276 (P.R. 2006); R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d
905, 909–13 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
60 Crouch v. John Jewell Aircraft, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-638-DJH 2016 WL 157470
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2016) (Order Granting Motion to Exclude Testimony of Har-
vey Rosen).
61 Id. at *4.
62 Id.
63 When flaws are readily apparent on the face of the expert report, counsel
may want to consider not deposing the expert. The motion to exclude should
emphasize that the report was required to contain all opinions and bases there-
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during the expert’s deposition, first have the expert admit that
(1) she was required to disclose any and all opinions in her re-
port; and (2) she has no other opinions other than those con-
tained in the report. Make clear to the expert that the
deposition is not a means for her to supplement her report with
additional opinions. This helps to prevent the opponent from
later claiming that any failure to disclose was harmless.
Pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), “exclusion of non-disclosed evi-
dence is automatic and mandatory . . . unless non-disclosure was
justified or harmless.”64 In determining whether the failure to
disclose was harmless, courts consider, in part, the prejudice or
surprise to the party and the ability to cure the prejudice. To the
extent that the expert attempts to testify regarding an opinion
not contained in her report, make the objection to the new
opinion clear and indicate the prejudices caused. By failing to
object, counsel runs the risk of the opponent later claiming that
any prejudice from the failure to disclose was cured at the
deposition.
With respect to the facts and data that were to be disclosed
within the report, again have the expert concede that she was
required to list all facts and data that she considered. Counsel
should then devote a portion of the deposition to determining
whether the expert relied on any facts or data missing from the
report. Indeed, in preparing for the deposition, make your own
assessment of whether there are documents that the expert
likely needed to render her opinions but were not disclosed. If
the expert agrees that she should have considered the missing
information, there is a basis to claim that the report lacks a logi-
cal foundation. If, on the other hand, the expert claims that she
did review the missing information but did not list it, there is a
basis to claim improper disclosure.
In a recent aviation case, the court utilized the expert’s depo-
sition to solidify its opinion that the expert’s report was insuffi-
cient.65 The court determined that the expert’s report did not
fore, as well as all the other information regarding the expert’s qualifications. By
not taking the deposition, it lessens the chance of the opponent claiming that
any prejudice was cured during the deposition. Although the rule does not con-
template allowing for this, some courts tend toward leniency in finding harmless
error.
64 Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Musser v.
Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004)).
65 Crouch, 2016 WL 3527, at *6 (Order Granting Motion to Exclude Harvey
Rosen).
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adequately disclose how the expert calculated the actual cost
and present value of the amount of money that would be re-
quired to fund the life care plans created by another expert.66
When asked in his deposition what data he relied upon to deter-
mine those values, the expert was unable to coherently explain
what, if any, data he relied upon. The court cited to this particu-
lar testimony to demonstrate that the expert could not clearly
articulate how he calculated the values.67 Accordingly, taking a
deposition despite knowing that an expert’s report was im-
proper provided additional fodder for excluding the expert.
3. Ways to Limit Prejudice
If an expert’s disclosure is insufficient, it becomes imperative
that the harmed party begins limiting the degree of prejudice
borne from the inadequate disclosure. Although the best out-
come will be the exclusion of the expert, there are many in-
stances in which the court will not elect to disqualify the
improperly disclosed expert.68 As a result, consider alternatives
to limit the prejudice that has occurred.
When making a motion to exclude, point out to the court
every aspect of the expert disclosure that makes it inadequate
and each of the prejudices that the inadequacies will cause.
When done properly, courts are often amenable to, at a mini-
mum, limiting the testimony that the expert is permitted to pro-
vide.69 In addition to this sanction, counsel may also file a
motion for the payment of the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.70 When facing a court that
does not wish to strike the expert, counsel may also seek more
creative sanctions. For example, counsel may ask to re-depose
66 Id.
67 Id. at *5.
68 E.g., Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 783 (6th Cir. 2003) (deny-
ing a motion to exclude on the grounds that a failure to disclose publications and
amount of compensation was harmless).
69 E.g., Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 368 F.3d 709, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2004) (ex-
cluding portions of expert testimony where expert disclosure did not include a
videotape that was the basis for the expert’s opinion); Abrams v. Mendsen, 218
F.R.D. 539, 541(E.D. Mich. 2003) (refusing to allow expert testimony regarding a
computer program because the expert failed to disclose the equations that were
used in the computer program).
70 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(A); e.g., Acadia Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 771 F.
Supp. 2d 172, 177 (D. Mass. 2011) (granting attorney’s fees associated with re-
viewing the expert’s report and deposing the expert).
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the expert after having an appropriate amount of time to
prepare.71
IV. CONCLUSION
Obtaining credible expert testimony is critical to a successful
outcome in most aviation cases. Rule 26(a)(2) provides the re-
quirements for expert witness disclosures. If an expert fails to
meet these requirements, the opposing party may move to ex-
clude the expert’s testimony. There are many steps that prudent
aviation counsel should take to ensure that her expert is not
excluded, including properly determining the status of the wit-
ness as a retained or non-retained expert, timely preparing the
expert and the required disclosure, and critically reviewing the
prepared disclosure for any compliance issues.
Conversely, the opposing counsel, upon receiving an inade-
quate disclosure, must limit the prejudice caused by it. After de-
termining that the report is not technically compliant, opposing
counsel should take additional steps to expose those weaknesses,
including through the use of well-crafted deposition questions.
While the ultimate goal is to have the expert’s testimony ex-
cluded, counsel should also keep in mind that there are other
methods to limit the prejudice caused by the noncompliant dis-
closures. Adherence to these strategies will limit the prejudicial
effect of the improperly disclosed expert testimony.
71 E.g., Diomed, Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D.
Mass. 2006) (granting, as a result of a failure to comply with discovery obliga-
tions, a short supplemental deposition solely on the issue of the expert’s lost-
profits theory, with costs borne by the party failing to properly disclose).
